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Stephen Richardson
Vladimir Putin, a little known name when he was $rst appointed Prime Minister 
by his superior and later, predecessor, Boris Yeltsin in 1999 has embarked on an 
aggressive campaign to restore Russia to prominence.1 Many have noted that 
he seeks to rebuild Soviet Russia – a fair assessment given his youth the Soviet 
golden era, and with statements such as “[t]he collapse of the Soviet Union 
was a major geopolitical disaster of the century.”2 Some of his recent actions, 
such as restoring Soviet symbols including the iconic Soviet $ve-pointed star 
and hammer & sickle, are further signs of his a"ections.3 President Putin has 
created a “strongman” image for himself that inspires the trust, respect and pride 
1  “Vladimir Putin: #e Rebuilding of ‘Soviet’ Russia.” BBC News., March 27, 2014, http://
www.bbc.com/news/magazine-26769481.
2  Ibid. 
3  Ibid. 
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Russians have in themselves and in their country.4 Con$dence in leadership and 
pride in country at home is arguably what Putin is seeking5, but he certainly 
wishes to undermine the U.S.-led global order and reframe it so Russia is 
respected and treated as an equal to other great powers.6 Projecting power 
abroad solidi$es President Putin’s position at home, and creates a sense of 
patriotism and pride among the “remasculinized” Russian people.7 President 
Putin’s assertive actions and rhetoric in Foreign Policy are certainly calcu-
lated for his domestic audience8 with the end-goal of Russian prominence.9 
#us it becomes apparent that Russia’s Foreign Policy is an extension of her 
Domestic Policy.10
Many commentators – especially western, seem to see Putin as a mysterious 
$gure who is somewhat unpredictable.11 #is however is a foolish and lazy 
pro$ling, because Putin is very clear in what he wants, states it plainly and 
follows through with what he says.12 Much of the mystery around him will 
disappear if commentators pay notice to what he says and follow his actions.13 
Putin reveals a lot of insight into his thinking in a speech he gave before the 
State Duma (Russia’s Parliament) in August, 1999 while being appointed 
Prime Minister by Yeltsin. In that speech, he laid out the groundwork for 
his entire tenure in o!ce by saying, “[w]e need to put an end to revolutions, 
4  “Vladimir unbound: Russia’s President is impervious to the woes that a'ict nor-
mal leaders.” !e Economist, January 27, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/eu-
rope/21689626-russias-president-impervious-woes-a'ict-normal-leaders-vladimir-unbound.
5  Valerie Sperling, “A Case of Putin Envy: Behind the Obsession with Russia’s Leader.” 
Foreign A"airs, 5  Nov, 2015, https://www.foreigna"airs.com/articles/russian-federa-
tion/2015-11-05/case-putin-envy.
6  Angela Stent, “Putin’s Power Play in Syria: How to Respond to Russia’s Intervention.” 
Foreign A"airs, January 1, 2016,  106-108. 
7  Op. Cit., fn. 5
8   Ibid. 
9  Op. Cit., fn. 1
10  Markian Dobczansky, “Russia’s Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges.” Wilson Center, 
July 7, 2011, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/russias-domestic-and-foreign-poli-
cy-challenges.
11  Op. Cit., fn. 1
12  Op. Cit., fn. 6
13  Op. Cit., fn. 1
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these are staged so that nobody can be rich. But at the moment the country 
needs reforms so that nobody can be poor. Although this task, unfortunately, 
is becoming harder by the day. #ere is no such thing as a thriving state with 
an impoverished population… Russia’s Territorial integrity is not subject to 
negotiation. Or, especially to horse trading or blackmail. We will take tough 
action against anyone who infringes upon our territorial integrity, using all 
the legal means available to us. Russia has been a great power for centuries, 
and remains so. It has always had and still has legitimate zones of interest 
abroad in both the former Soviet lands and elsewhere. We should not drop our 
guard in this respect, neither should we allow our opinion to be ignored.”14
#is makes it clear that he was aiming to launch a two-prong campaign 
to rebuild and reestablish Russia as a global power and one to be reckoned 
with. #is campaign has had two clear fronts (prongs): the $rst of which, is 
a domestic policy to restore stability to the country to end “revolutions” that 
had previously diminished Russia’s capabilities while the second, is his foreign 
policy where he seeks to regain Russia’s place as a dominate world power 
that has a seat the highest levels in the international order and commands 
respect.15 On both of these fronts, Putin has proven to be rather successful, 
and in doing so has become immensely popular with his own people.16  He 
has been so successful at this that he is even admired by some abroad – par-
ticularly among Americans who are critical of President Obama.17
For three years in a row – 2013-2015, Vladimir Putin was ranked by Forbes 
as the most powerful man in the world, a statement that is as understandable 
as it is controversial.18 #is may come as a surprise given the dire economic 
situation Russia is in – largely at the hands of Putin, as well the widespread 
reporting of corruption and incompetence of the country’s political sys-
tem, shrinking and stagnating work force due to the falling oil prices, and 
14  Ibid. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Op. Cit., fn. 5
17  Ibid.
18  David M. Ewalt, “#e World’s Most Powerful People.” Forbes, November 4, 2015, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidewalt/2015/11/04/the-worlds-most-powerful-people-
2015/#47dde7221868.
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crumbling infrastructure, namely in the periphery.19 On the &ipside how-
ever, it may seem like common sense given his successful consolidation of 
power, impeccable military record, soaring popularity, and a foreign policy 
that has inspired admiration at home and awe abroad.20 Immediately upon 
taking power, Putin sought to reverse Yeltsin’s policy of autonomy towards 
the regional governments in favor of a strong centralized state.21 Putin has 
relentlessly pursued these goals, e"ectively gaining this power consolida-
tion that he has strived for.22 #is accomplishment is impressive given the 
opposition he receives, much of which is predictably from the periphery 
(regional governments) whom feel they are either being neglected, having 
their toes stepped on, or both.23 Russia’s corruption level is unusually high for 
a developed, wealthy country and ranks similarly to notoriously corrupt states 
such as Mali and Madagascar, coming in at 127th in 2013 on the Corruption 
Perception Index.24 #is and the economic di!culties faced by Russia due to 
economic sanctions that were brought on by Putin’s aggressive foreign policy 
may make it seem odd to rank him the most powerful man in the world, when 
he is seemingly undoing his country that is already crumbling.25 Nevertheless, 
this may be masked by Putin’s impressive popularity that has been consistently 
&oating between 60-90% for his entire 15-year career26 - considerably higher 
than that of many western leaders, especially American Presidents.27  Even 
19  “Putin’s War on the West.” !e Economist, February 14, 2015, http://www.economist.
com/news/leaders/21643189-ukraine-su"ers-it-time-recognise-gravity-russian-threatand-
counter.
20  Bingham G. Powell, Russell J. Dalton, and Kaaren Strom. Comparative Politics Today: A 
World View. Boston, MA: Longman, 2012, 348. 
21  Ibid. 
22  Ibid. 
23  Ibid. 
24   Op. Cit., fn. 1
25  Evgenia Pismennaya and Anna Andrianova, “Russia’s Economy Is Tanking, So Why Is 
Putin Smiling?” Bloomberg News, February 29, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2016-03-01/as-russia-s-economy-contracts-putin-s-preferred-indicator-is-up.
26  Op. Cit., fn. 4
27  George Gao and Samantha Smith, “Presidential job approval ratings from Ike to Obama.” 
Pew Research Center. January 12, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/12/
presidential-job-approval-ratings-from-ike-to-obama/.
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more important is how Putin has consolidated power in this dysfunctional 
system, and how much in&uence he exerts today, which as will be shown, 
knows few limits. 
Immediately upon taking o!ce, Putin sought to launch his assertive cam-
paign to rebuild Russia to its former glory, seizing every opportunity a"orded 
him and never backing down from a challenge that served his interests. If 
Sulla, Rome’s $rst unlawful Dictator had the cunning of a fox and courage of 
a lion, then Putin has the cunning of a fox and formidability of a bear.  He 
proved this immediately by launching the Second Chechen War in the same 
month he took o!ce, in response to the separatist movement and humiliating 
defeat (stalemate) those ill-equip and poorly trained Chechen insurgents had 
in&icted on the once proud Russia, several years prior under the leadership 
of Yeltsin.28 In less than a year Chechnya was subjugated, restoring Russian 
pride, and Putin set a red line forever forbidding compromise over the small 
republics place in the Russian Federation.29 #is made Putin a household 
name in Russia, whereas when he took o!ce very few members of the State 
Duma had even heard of him, with some even pronouncing his name wrong.30 
#e next focus of his campaign, now that he attained gravitas, was crushing 
the Oligarchs, which he saw as parasitic towards Russia’s economy and social 
vibrancy. A week before being elected President, Putin warned the Oligarchs 
that their reign was coming to an end – a threat he followed through with 
- and is one of his lasting legacies.31 Putin, in spirit of the gangsterism that 
had gripped Russia during the 1990’s, gave the Oligarchs an o"er they 
couldn’t refuse – surrender power and a portion of your wealth in exchange 
for security and prosperity, or lose everything - most of whom refused.32 #us 
the wrath of Putin was inspired, and the $rst targets he had in mind, were 
the media moguls, starting with Vladimir Gusinsky, owner of NTV the only 
independent national television station and the richest, most powerful man in 
28  Op. Cit., fn. 1
29  Ibid. 
30  Ibid. 
31  “Putin versus the Oligarchs?” !e Economist, June 17, 2000, http://www.economist.com/
node/82208.
32  Masha Gessen, “#e Myth of the Russian Oligarchs.” !e New York Times, December 11, 
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/11/opinion/masha-gessen-the-myth-of-the-rus-
sian-oligarchs.html.
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Russian media.33 He was forced into exile, and later arrested in Spain under 
charges of Fraud.34 #en Putin proceeded to eviscerate his media empire, or 
rather reorganized to $t the needs of the State.35 After this, non-state media 
at the federal level was e"ectively eradicated, and continuing to this day, all 
federal media outlets in Russia are either state owned or sponsored.36 #e 
next major sacking, was that of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the head of the oil 
group Yukos and one of the world’s richest men.37 #rown in jail under 
charges of tax evasion in 2004, his empire was seized by the state or more 
appropriately by Putin in a move that was seen by many as a war declared 
on the so called Oligarchs.38 #is view was not unrealistic, as Putin would 
in fact seek to continue eradicating the Oligarchs, until they were essentially 
either of no concern to him, or $rmly in his pocket.39 
Putin’s calculations have proven to be impeccable, he knew that in order 
to achieve his objectives he must $rst uproot corruption and consolidate 
sources of power.40 #e sources of power he needed were in the grip of the 
Oligarchs, who would make his agenda di!cult if it didn’t suit their in-
terests.41 Presumably then, this is the real reason that Putin declared “war” 
on them, a “war” which he has clearly won.42 #is is signi$cant, given that 
conventional wisdom in the West that Putin may be shooting himself in 
the foot by continuing aggressive foreign policies that get Russia slapped 
with more western-formed sanctions, because a slumping economy would 
surely provoke the Oligarchs.43 #e problem with this analysis however, is 
that the “Oligarchs” being spoken of in popular consciousness have been 
33  Ibid. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Marshall Goldman, “Putin and the Oligarchs.” Foreign A"airs, November 1, 2004, 
https://www.foreigna"airs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2004-11-01/putin-and-oligarchs.
38  Ibid. 
39  Op. Cit., fn. 32
40  Ibid. 
41  Ibid. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Ibid. 
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all but snu"ed out by Putin already.44 It’s been years since Putin has ended 
the Oligarchy, and since 2004 he has consolidated power to a remarkable 
degree.45 Political Scientist Karen Dawisha calls the product of this con-
solidation “Kleptocratic Authoritarianism,” an all-encompassing system of 
interlocking dependencies between various Russian elites and the Russian 
State.46 In this system there are three conditions for the new elite; $rst - they 
must pay to get into political o!ce, second – they can use their o!ce to 
accumulate greater wealth (as long as they stay in the good graces of Putin) 
and third – they may not use their o!ces to acquire greater political power.47 
#us the highest and most important positions in Russian society are little 
more than puppets to Putin, who essentially can exercise no independent 
political power outside the parameters he sets. In 2011, Mikhail Prokhorov, 
a billionaire tried to test the boundary of these new conditions by reshaping 
a pro-Kremlin political party and was immediately smacked down by Putin. 
When Prokhorov was threatened with having all his assets seized, he fell back 
in line and still remains loyal through this new economic hardship.48 In setting 
up this system, Putin has created a relationship where the new elite vies for 
power amongst each other, by kicking each other out or swallowing up smaller 
members, instead of pursing independent political agendas.49 #is creates a safe 
guard for Putin himself, where he no longer has to worry about the elites trying 
to undo his power, as they don’t have the means to challenge him without being 
eradicated and are too busy squabbling over each other.50 #us Putin is the only 
one in this equation who is secure, and has created for himself a self-serving 
system that enables him to watch over his newly consolidated power, and keep 
his thumb on those who try to break out of it. 
However, Putin’s consolidation of power is not completely secure and is gar-
nering resistance from di"erent fronts– social and political resistance and an 
44  Ibid. 
45  Bingham G. Powell, Russell J. Dalton, and Kaaren Strom. Comparative Politics Today: A 
World View. Boston, MA: Longman, 2012, 348-349. 
46   Op. Cit., fn. 32
47  Ibid. 
48  Ibid. 
49  Ibid. 
50  Ibid. 
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overall lack of social cohesion.51 #e most famous examples of the resistance Putin 
faces are from the pro-LBGT community, spearheaded by the all-female punk band, 
“Pussy Riot.”52 #ese critics assert that Putin is setting up witch-hunts of gays to 
distract the population and turn them against themselves.53 #is criticism is not 
unfounded - historically this type of scapegoating has been used in such a manner, 
as a mask to cover failing polices.54 Even more troubling to these proponents is 
the inhumane treatment jailed activists and innocent gays have been receiving.55 
In response to this, Pussy Riot has set up a new organization to investigate and 
bring these troubles to light.56 Such investigations and corresponding activism have 
raised much awareness to the issue and has put immense pressure on Putin from 
outside sources, namely international humanitarian organizations. Before this, 
as late as 2013 most outsiders were more or less silent on the issue, or simply 
unaware.57 #is has undoubtedly acted as a speed bump for Putin who wants 
a smooth sailing path to reform, and only further ads to the lack of trust in 
the government as a whole among the Russian population.58 
Putin’s arrangement with the new elites has sparked dismay from non-con-
nected professionals and businessmen, as well as much of the domestic working 
class that is not in the immediate sphere of Moscow.59 Many have had enough 
of it, and are &eeing the country in great numbers.60 In some segments of the 
private sector, as much as 50% of professionals are either leaving or seek-
ing to leave Russia in hopes of $nding a better life, along with their fellow 
51  Kenneth Rapoza, “Russia’s three biggest Problems.” Forbes, January 24, 2013, http://www.
forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/01/24/russias-three-biggest-problems/#3454e9ea6e55.
52  Nikita Sologub, “Under Suspicion: Death in a Siberian Cell.” !e Guardian, March 9, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/09/russia-siberian-cell-death-pussy-riot.
53  Harvey Fierstein, “Russia’s Anti-Gay Crackdown.” !e New York Times, July 21, 2013, http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/07/22/opinion/russias-anti-gay-crackdown.html.
54  Ibid. 
55  Op. Cit., fn. 52
56  Ibid. 
57  Op. Cit., fn. 53
58  Op. Cit., fn. 51
59  Ibid.
60  Ibid. 
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disenfranchised homosexual citizens.61 #is leads to a “brain drain” that 
not only drives away talent, but also inhibits the country’s ability to attract 
foreign talent.62 Putin faces other problems with the workforce among those 
who choose to stay – he cannot a"ord to pay all his public employees and 
they are starting to protest his policies openly- placing direct blame on 
Moscow, if not Putin himself.63 #ese are problems that Putin is struggling 
with, and whether or not he has calculated for this particular development 
is unknown, but it certainly seems that he has no real plan to deal with it.64 
Similar to these issues, Putin displays a lack of action in another weak area 
of Russian Society – corruption and incompetent political institutions on 
the periphery. 
One of the most visible issues that is a"ecting the prosperity of Russia, 
is the rampant corruption that is extreme by the standards of developed 
countries, and a major hindrance towards stability and growth.65 Russia 
today is in a dire economic situation for the third time since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union – yet Putin is able to con$dently address his people 
and say not to worry about the tough times ahead, out of a sense of patri-
otism – while scapegoating the West.66 Few leaders have the gal or ability 
to take this position or carry it out67– but Putin remains steadfast, living up 
to his reputation of a “strongman President.”68 Putin conveniently blames 
western sanctions placed on Russia, in retaliation to his forceful annexation 
of Crimea, but this is really a symptom of a larger problem; Russia’s status 
as a “rentier state” who’s economy is almost entirely dependent on its oil 
exports.69 Putin has understood this for a very long time and it is an issue he 
61  Ibid. 
62  Ibid. 
63  Shellie Karabell, “Putin’s Problem: Corruption, Not Just Sanctions.” Forbes, December 
22, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/shelliekarabell/2014/12/22/putins-problems-corrup-
tion-not-just-sanctions/#1051e426f9cd.
64  Ibid. 
65  Op. Cit., fn. 1
66  Op. Cit., fn. 63
67  Ibid. 
68  Op. Cit., fn. 5
69  Op. Cit., fn. 63
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has attempted to address for many years, however this sti&ing corruption is 
an underlying hick-up and road block he continues to run into.70
#e problem rests with an immensely large and complicated, if not con-
tradictory set of business laws and regulations that enables courts, prosecu-
tors and tax o!cials to pick and choose which regulations they uphold.71 
#is allows them great amounts of freedom in helping or hurting business 
– whichever is to their advantage.72 Natalya Volchkova of Moscow’s New 
Economic School states that, “Regulation is about punishing business, not 
helping business to behave properly,” and continues to insist that it is very 
easy for government o!cials to imprison business owners for the smallest 
infractions.73 She states that the tax inspector today is as feared as the KGB 
once was – they come regularly to inspect businesses and can easily spot 
“wrong doings” then slap the owner with a $ne - which can be appealed in 
court, but in the meantime if that option is chosen, their accounts may be 
seized.74 #is kind of regulatory practice is essentially a new kind of extortion 
reminiscent of the Russian Ma$a’s free reign in the 1990’s.75 Putin has tried 
to address this issue (to what extent is unknown) but he faces resistance 
from tax o!cials across the board, and they promise to resist even more 
$rmly if he persists, because they see reform as a threat to their livelihood.76 
It would appear that this is one of the few areas where Putin’s consolidated 
powers have been checked. Why exactly that is remains unclear, but one 
can deduce that Putin simply cannot a"ord to alienate these allies, as he 
already goes through great pains to ensure the loyalty of many other state 
o!cials that make such consolidations of power possible in the $rst place.77 
#e fact that Putin seemingly cannot address this issue is a challenge to his 
“strong man presidency” so he is therefore forced to cover it up.78 He does 
70  Ibid. 
71  Ibid. 
72  Ibid. 
73  Ibid. 
74  Ibid. 
75  Ibid. 
76  Ibid. 
77  Ibid. 
78  Op. Cit., fn. 78
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this by ensuring these issues are not brought to light in the media and by 
using the West as a scapegoat, in order to mask his own inability to address 
the issue.79 To this end, Putin’s initiatives are a &ying success, part of his 
genius, and partially why he has proven to be so successful in accomplishing 
his broader agendas. 
To further add to the complication, Putin has sought to divert attention 
from domestic a"airs altogether through his actions in Ukraine80, thus his 
foreign policy becomes an extension of his domestic policy.81 He attempts 
to snu" out dissidence at home by stoking patriotism from actions abroad, 
and by successfully framing such actions as defensive against western in-
roads.82 With this understood, it’s easier to understand his persistent actions 
in the Ukraine despite the hardships the entire country faces because of his 
seemingly sel$sh actions. #e annexation of Crimea and barring Ukraine 
from entering the EU can partially be understood at the systemic level of 
analysis, as a matter of power given that Russia’s “sphere of in&uence” has 
been gradually shrinking as the EU has been growing eastward since the end 
of the Cold War.83 #is is problematic to Russian power because it limits 
the number of states who are in her sphere of in&uence.84 Further, it poses 
a challenge to Russia’s preferred diplomatic and economic relations with 
Eastern European countries, especially Ukraine given its deep historic ties, 
strategic trade value and access to warm water in the Black Sea.85 At the State 
level, EU expansion can be seen as an encroachment on intangible power, 
as Ukraine is the homeland of the Russian people, giving it symbolic and 
79  Ibid. 
80  Op. Cit., fn. 19
81  Op. Cit., fn. 10
82  Op. Cit., fn. 5.
83  Roland Oliphant, “Vladimir Putin blames Nato expansion for rising tension with Eu-
rope.” !e Telegraph, January 11, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vlad-
imir-putin/12093042/Vladimir-Putin-blames-Nato-expansion-for-rising-tension-with-Eu-
rope.html.
84 Ibid. 
85  “Putin the Uniter: #e war has made most Ukrainians see Russians as enemies, 
not Friends.” !e Economist, June 20, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/eu-
rope/21654663-war-has-made-most-ukrainians-see-russians-enemies-not-friends-putin-
uniter.
paideia
44
social importance to Russians.86 #is is signi$cant given that the majority of 
those in eastern parts of Ukraine, who are ethnic Russians, support Putin and 
want closer ties with Russia, while the Russians themselves overwhelmingly 
support the actions of Putin and his image.87 Such actions, completely in 
de$ance of the West, have increased Russian power in the eyes of Russians 
themselves, and created a sense of “Russian Machoism” that centers on Putin 
himself.88 #e Russian Bear has convinced his countrymen at home that his 
actions abroad are for the preservation, power and security of the Russian 
Federation itself, quieting concerns over the troubled economy and sti&ing 
corruption.89 Putin has ingeniously gone about this campaign in a way that 
bene$ts both the state and himself, largely by stoking a stronger sense of 
patriotism – echoing the iconic phrase, “For the Motherland!” 
In Syria we again see both systemic and individual level actions, where 
both the Russian Government and Putin himself bene$ts. #anks to Putin, 
Russia bene$ts by embarrassing the United States, undermining her author-
ity in the Middle East, and taking a larger seat at the negotiating table.90 
#us Russia now has a larger say in International A"airs, where it seems 
few issues concerning Europe and the Middle East can be addressed without 
her input.91 Putin bene$ts in that it is he himself who e"ectively wields this 
in&uence – where he continually stumps Washington, increases gravitas in 
the International Community, and improves his image at home.92 It is clear 
that the conduct of this crisis is dictated by, and done on behalf of Putin.93 
It is his goals that are being sought, his power consolidation at home which 
makes it possible, and his diplomacy that routinely outfoxes the West.
In adopting this course of action, Putin has engineered a unique unitary 
autocracy that is centered on one person, rather than a series of institutions 
86  Ibid. 
87  Op. Cit., fn. 1
88  Op. Cit., fn. 5
89  Ibid. 
90  Op. Cit., fn. 6
91  Ibid. 
92  Ibid. 
93  Op. Cit., fn. 19
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as in Iran, or a political party such as in China.94 His hybrid Presidential-
Parliamentary Government has become unrecognizable and incomparable 
to its model, the French Government.95 While he has enjoyed the power of 
vast consolidation, and a State Duma that essentially does as he orders, he 
faces an insurmountable problem of corruption and failing institutions that 
he cannot personally supervise on the periphery.96 #e leaders of these insti-
tutions don’t have the free range of movement in order to increase e!ciency, 
and even if they did – corruption and bribery seems to hinder those e"orts.97 
His inability to diversify the economy is starting to sting badly, although his 
puppets and he seem to be detached from these economic hardships due to 
their plundering of the economy and amassing wealth for themselves, much 
of which is stored in foreign bank accounts.98 
While the policies, actions and successes of the mighty Russian bear are 
impressive, they are not absolute and not without consequence. For all its 
promises, Putin’s reforms have created some major kinks that need address-
ing. While his foreign policy has created an immensely popular image of 
himself domestically, globally his image is shaky at best. #e same can be 
said of the Russian Federation which is indeed, respected, feared and pow-
erful, but seemingly heading towards a weaker position. Despite his shaky 
image, Putin is arguably the most powerful man in the world – certainly the 
most dangerous, therefore he ought to be feared, not respected. His policies 
at home and actions abroad have far reaching consequences that a"ect the 
globe and the entire American-led international order. His interests domi-
nate conversations on International A"airs, and have implications for us all, 
which is precisely what he wants and why we are living in the Age of Putin.
94  Bingham G. Powell, Russell J. Dalton, and Kaaren Strom. Comparative Politics Today: A 
World View. Boston, MA: Longman, 2012, 347-349. 
95  Ibid. 
96  Op. Cit., fn. 19
97  Op. Cit., fn. 63
98  Op. Cit., fn. 78
